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1.0 Executive Summary
Review by the Element Ill, third party team began on July 1, 1991 and consisted
of Mr. Robert L. Reynolds and Dr. Wilson Goddard, assisted by LCAQMD1 staff
members Mr. Ross Kauper and Mr. John Thompson.
The scope of the project included: 1) a review of the air and noise monitoring
program as implemented at the Puna Geothermal Venture project during the
"KS-8 uncontrolled vent of June 12-14, 1991", with a special emphasis on making
recommendations for extent, equipment, location, quality of data assurance and
management changes; 2) a precursory appraisal of issued ATC2 and GRP3,
complaint response and regulatory 'practices to assess compliance and
effectiveness of control technologies given the new information; 3) suggestions on
how to better anticipate, mitigate and manage possible future similar events from
an air quality and noise perspective with the public input and technology
considerations; and 4) to develop an accident scenario and emission profile
independently for use in Part II of this report in which a micro meterological
assessment, and determination of correlation with health and measured
aerometric values is presented.
Emissions of noise and air pollutants caused widespread complaints and concerns.
Some residents in the local area were evacuated as a safety precaution, advisories
were issued and ambient measurements of noise and H2S indicated levels
markedly above those anticipated in the issued permits as limits or believed to be'
acceptable. The emergency response plan interacted with the DOH4 role in
monitoring and making recommmendations for actions taken to manage the
event.
There are seven air monitoring stations presently operated by three semi-
independent parties. The three independent efforts of PGV5, DOH-CAB6 and
DOH-ASAB7 need to be combined into a single monitoring program directed by
a committee of agency, industry and active environmentalists (see section 4). '
1LCAQMD - Lake County Air Quality Management District, a California specialI;>istrict that
enforces federal, state and local air and noise regulation with extensive
~eothennal.experience.
ATC - Authority to Construct permit issued by the DOH pursuant to federal and state law
for the protection of air quality.
3GRP - Geothennal Resource permit issued by the County ofHawaii for the protection of
the public, and specifically in this case regulation of noise.
4DOH - Hawaii Department ofHealth
5PGV- Puna Geothennal Venture, the owner or permit holder. Used Interchangeably with
Onnat Energy Systems International in this report.
600H-CAB - The Oean Air Branch of the Hawaii Department ofHealth
700H-ASAB - The Air Surveillance and Analysis Branch of the Hawaii Department of
Health
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Two background stations and other stations have provided data establishing a near
zero background. The number of stations, seven is in excess to what should be
necessary for compliance monitoring. The program should direct a greater
amount of resources to other areas of the air program; most specifically, source
testing and characterization of emissions, abatement technology application and
compliance testing, and ambient monitoring for components other than hydrogen
sulfide (H2S8).
Several stations need to correct noted equipment, quality assurance and audit
deficiencies, primarily DOH-CAB stations.
Though recommended changes in air monitoring stations are made, it is clear
considerable data was provided by the air monitoring in place to establish exceeds
of the 100 ppbv limit. Air monitoring stations with a couple of noted exceptions
produced reasonably reliable and meaningful data. PGV's monitoring effort
follows their issued ATC. The field monitoring effort by DOH and PGV was
extensive and provided reasonable and believable data.
There was little or no mitigation proposed or sought during the uncontrolled
venting to control air or noise emissions. This process lead to venting in a
manner that increased impacts on local residential areas. Recommendations are
made to have in place a wet cyclone or similar device for noise, H2S and
particulate abatement.
There was no attempt to specifically estimate or measure net emissions of H2S
and other components. This made management of the event cumbersome and the
impact of unknown emissions difficult to estimate at the time of the accident or
with hindsight. No drift or particulate samples were collected, though both are
believed to have been emitted to the air in substantial amounts and a sample
submitted by a public member raises concern. Insufficient information exists to
accurately estimate emissions. It is recommended that testing become a normal
part of management during venting, that DOH gain the ability to perform simpler
teseting for H2S and that Condition 20 of the ATC be implemented promptly to
measure trace toxic components. That such information to be gained by testing
be used to trip toxic ambient monitoring requirements, review of potential plant
reliability or corrosion problems, as well a review for potential abatement and
improved management for any components of concern.
The ATC permits are extensive and criticized as regards: specific ambient air
monitoring standard requirements which are too lax and not tied to an emissions
8 H2S - hydogen sulfide gas the odorous and poisonous gas commonly referred to throughout this
report.
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rate, operate on a sliding breakdown or upset that is detennined by PGV
activities; allow natural (background) emissions effects that deviate significantly
from EPA and typical air agency procedures to accommodate monitoring
influenced by natural uncontrolled events; characterizing emissions timely; and
are lax in requiring and substantiating BACT choices and claimed efficiencies.
The GRP required noise limits were exceeded by more than 25 dBA on a semi
continuous basis during the event. The GRP required monitoring was reviewed
for utility at determining compliance with limitations, and recommendations are
made to clarify the pennit and noise data measurement and reporting presently
utilized.
Additional equipment for the purposes of emissions testing, inventory and
ambient monitoring is recommended.
2.0 Recommendations
2.1 Air Monitoring Network
1. If background is consistently near zero, as indicated by this review, the use
of background monitoring sites should be discontinued, and the cost savings for
background monitoring should be redirected to source control, evaluation and
high quality portable field monitors. The number of stations (7) exceeds that
necessary for compliance determination.
2. Unify the air monitoring efforts into a single comprehensive program
managed and audited by the state, but which receives and follows input and policy
from a committee consisting of active environmentalists, industry and agency
people. The existing DOH and contractor staff could share responsibility for the
operation. The following attributes should be ad(1ed:
• The monitoring program expanded to verify the concentrations of other
potentially toxic pollutants indicated by reservoir and process chemistry.
Examples include lead, chrome, mercury, boron, nickel, and arsenic.
• Each permanent H2S air monitoring station should have a meteorological
measurement system and remote access (modem) capability incorporated. They
should be password protected but access automated for those needing and using
the information.
• A uniform functional, as short as possible, sampling intake, manifold, and
monitor intake line should be used and cleaned regularly.
• Add a multi-sensor 30 to 40 meter meteorological tower to provide
information relative to atmospheric stability, multi-level temperature gradients
and wind fields, preferably at the Irvine site.
• A quality assurance program be implemented at all stations with independent
DOH staff performing quarterly audits. The existing SAle quality assurance
program, or the GAMP program should be used as a basis to develop a single
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quality assurance program, but also correcting the noted deficiencies in reporting
and audit approaches (see discussion sections).
• Two additional field portable H2S monitors (Jerome equivalent) be made
available by the developer and properly maintained for use by DOH and/or other
responding agency. One should be portable and configured for sample initiation
by the public with automatic data recording. Local firemen and other agencies
likely to respond to a hazardous H2S event should have one or more safety
systems for use with each responding crew which give numerical readout and
audio alarm.
• Recommended Actions at existing stations are summarized below and further
discussed in section 6.
Recommendations Applicable (see below Key)
Station / Recommend Key-:::
Alvarez Station (CAB)
Wade Station (CAB)
Leilani Station(ASAB)
Nanawale Station (ASAB)
Ormat (paV) sw
Ormat (paV) SE
Woods Station (paV)
123456789
x XXXXXX X
X XXXXXX X
X X X X X X
X X X X X X
X X X X
X X X X X
X X X X X
10
X
X
11
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Recommendations Key (not necessarily priority ordered):
1. Manifold, intake probe and sample line replacement or modification to remove condensation
needed immediately.
2. Immediate and independent gas phase audit is needed (full probe preferred at all stations).
3. Improvement in written station procedures, data handling and station equipment diagram
needed soon.
4. . Manifold, intake probe and sample line regular clean:ing.
5. Establish a station log and perhaps monitor log that remains with the station and equipment.
6. Offset chart zero by 10% and carefully document drift if accuracy in the 2-6 ppb range is to
be claimed. Establish tolerances in the QA program that reflect the desired low
concentration accuracy.
7. Add password level remote access integration into the QA and data reduction of station
data. Provide password level controlled immediate access to agencies desiring and needing
infonnation.
8. Add meteorological measurement ability.
9. Calibrate and audit station at a lower range of H2S than presently utilized.
10. Add functional data loggers (CAB is presently preferred)
11. Prepare monthly tables showing hourly averages and peak daily H2S values, and DOH
should clearly identify station location, name and operator.
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3. Specific to the short term utilization of the present monitoring station
resources; reference Map A shows a preliminary proposed station redistribution
and possible reduction in number for discussion. It is recommended to occur
only with a shifting of those resources to the control technology assessment and
source testing effort, and can rationally be delayed until after power plant startup
and shakedown if such is to occur in the immediate future. Only one station at a
time should be relocated. If in fact the public or others are in disagreement,
tracer releases under varied meteorologic conditions should be performed to
identify locations and weather patterns of maximum impact prior to moving
stations. Field portable monitoring could be used to partially substitute, and
. more thought as to the actual and expected emissions scenarios of the project need
to be developed to influence this decision.
• Retain only (1) one background station at Nanawale (Flower Rd.). Drop the
PGV Woods Station.
• Relocate the PGV Southeast Station more to the southwest to avoid heavy
agricultural influence and provide for increased community coverage.
• Relocate the Alvarez Station approximately 2000 ft. north or drop.
• Retain the Irvine Station for met data only and add multi-level measurement
capability for wind and temperature. .
2.2 Geothermal Resources Permit and Noise Monitorin~
1. Clarification of the GRP requirements reflected in this review should be
performed. One government office should be designated to receive and
investigate complaints of noise. They should be available to any person that
would choose to complain to them instead of PGV. Anonymous complaints
should be taken, and investigated if practical.
2. At least one mobile/portable unmanned monitor with shelter and modem
access, that can be used at complainant homes and is capable of determining
compliance should be made available to Hawaii County or others.
3. Spot checks should be performed more frequently by an agency staff to add
credibility. More frequent site inspections of PGV's effort and periodic
comparison of calibrators could also add to the credibility and acceptance of the
noise monitoring program.
4. The present noise standards should be evaluated for effectiveness by
reviewing all complaints and their resolution. Typically, noise assessments for
source and BACT determinations are specialized. The Planning Director should,
if he believes it is necessary, seek expert opinion on BACT assessments from an
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independent consultant paid for by POY but contracted with and reporting to the.
County.
5. The monitoring effort should be directed to resolve complaints and identify
source problem solutions.
6. There is too great an emphasis on monitoring sound and part of this effort
is recommended to be directed at specific problem noise identification.
7. Determinations of BACT should be sensitive to the worker safety aspects,
and not allow early choices of equipment to dictate subsequent noise control steps
that unreasonably create a choice between a safety and noise problem.
2.3 Permit and Compliance Review Recommendations
1. The 100 ppbv one hour average limitation (AAQS) be evaluated from the
experience of this incident and review. Evaluations of remaining health
complaints should be performed by DOH as promptly as practical.
2. One goveminent office be designated to receive and investigate noise and
air quality complaints believed to result from the project. The present practice of
recording tape messages, reading back and referring complaint directly to POV
should cease.
3. Resource characterizations required under Condition 20 of the ATC be
performed as soon as practical and evaluated on a timely basis to better
understand and estimate emissions, and determine if project design problems may
result from any unexpected resource characteristic.
.
4. DOH staff should, actively participate in source tests, and develop the
ability to independently quantify H2S emissions during drilling, stacking and
uncontrolled or controlled venting. Specifically, the following is also
recommended for timely consideration.
• Measurement characterization of drift and trace toxics contained in particulate
and gas phase must be performed during emission release events until such time
as they are well documented and established.
• An emphasis should be placed on developing an accurate and comprehensive
emissions inventory and geothermal resource chemical constituent database
specific to the project and individual wells.
• Emissions limits and/or technology development and application to all known
emission points based upon Best Available Control Technology (BACT) should be
further developed, and tested for performance under good dispersion conditions
before needed (start with the stacking control system).
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• The possible need and advisability of air drilling should be investigated and the
restriction removed from the ATC permit if necessary to provide safety in
drilling.
• The need to factually determine whether a pressure surge (gas pressured) from
the bottom of the hole in the reservoir, or water/mud hammer, caused the
"explosions" is critical to potential risk, and DOH staff should seek an expert final
opinion explained to their satisfaction.
• The maximum accidental exposure to those in close residency should be re-
evaluated, and where concern exists, the individual resident be educated as to
risks, made aware of any bad circumstances or risky operations as early as
possible, and given whatever assurance possible about DOH resolve to protect
their air quality.
3.0 INTRODUCTION
Element ill is the third element of the Geothermal Action Plan by the State of
Hawaii to investigate the unplanned venting incident on June 12 and 13, 1991 at
the geothermal plant site of Puna Geothermal Venture (PVG) in Kapoha, Puna
District, Island of Hawaii, involving the KS-8, a geothermal well. The lead
agencies for this review are the State of Hawaii Department of Health (DOH), the
Hawaii County Planning Department and the Mayor's office.
This Element ill study was conducted at the request of the above agencies by an
independent investigative team consisting of Robert L. Reynolds, Lake County
Air Quality Management District, and Dr. Wilson B. Goddard, Goddard and
Goddard Engineering, both of California. Work was initiated on 7/1/91, with the
primary emphasis being an independent evaluation of the existing air and noise
monitoring programs, monitoring the incident, and to develop recommendations
for the appropriate changes in the monitoring program equipment and
procedures. Secondary tasks included an evaluation of permits. Part II authored
by Dr. Goddard includes a microscale meteorological evaluation of the project
area and accident meteorology and an assessment of health complaints compiled -
with public member assistance. The accident can serve as a learning experience
from which an improvement of the overall regulatory program can result. The
investigators were assisted by Ross Kauper and John Thompson of the LCAQMD,
whom performed review of data for consistency and aided in evaluating
recommendations for station relocation.
3.1 Annroach
The investigative approach was to collect and review the available documentation
regarding monitoring' station operation and the emissions event information. The
team exchanged data and initial findings approximately every two days since July
9, 1991. Mr. Reynolds traveled to Hawaii and conducted meetings and interviews
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with DOH and County of Hawaii officials on July 1&2, 1991. Site inspection and
meetings with public representatives in Hawaii were conducted on July 2, 3 & 4,
1991. Videotaping and phone interviews were performed to obtain additional
understanding of actual operations and insight regarding measured area impacts.
Meetings and conversations with the state health agencies, interested public and
developer representatives occurred to refine the scope of the investigation and
obtain additional insight regarding related aspects of the event.
The available information was gathered and analyzed for completeness and
additional data requests and follow up were performed, not all are yet complete.
Information analysis included evaluation of visual features,. observations of site
visits and video tape recordings of all equipment. Monitoring and quality
assurance data was reviewed for completeness and internally checked for obvious
errors or conflicts.
The event sequence and provided mud logs were reviewed for possible
information regarding timing and source strength from which assumptions
regarding emissions estimates were derived for use in impact assessment. This
was performed without input from Element I.
Steam and or gas composition data was collected and reviewed to provide
information regarding other possible monitoring concerns.
Included in the data requests were adequate area, monitoring and complaint
location maps, that were plotted by Dr. Goddard, for the correlation of observed
measurements and reported effects (See Part m. Also included were requested
and reviewed copies of the ATC permit.
Information was largely reviewed as received, but substantial additional questions
were asked of industry and vendors. When timely received, it has been
incorporated into this report. Several questions remain. Individuals
knowledgeable in geothermal development, services and regulation were relied
upon and interviewed to obtain added insight in regard to specific questions to
their area of expertise. Part I of this report is a compilation of the authors
understanding and experience with the subject area and represent his best
judgment. Part II of this report is authored by Dr. Goddard.
3,2 Aggroach Health Survey and Dispersion
-See Part II
4.0 Existin& Aerometric Monitorin& Pro&ram
4,1 Existin& Aerometric Monitorin~ Stations
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At the time of the site visit seven H2S air monitoring stations were operational.
The Hawaii Department of Health (DOH) operates four of the stations. Each of
two stations report to two different Deputy Directors. The Clean Air Branch
(CAB) is part of Environmental Health and the Air Surveillance and Analysis
Branch (ASAB) is part of Health Resources. The developer, OESI or Puna
Geothermal Venture (PGV) utilizes a contractor "Science Applications
International Corporation" (SAIC) to operate three additional stations. These
stations are listed below with an indication of the H2S monitor type, presence of
meteorological and noise monitoring instruments and operating entity.
Considerable additional documentation on configuration is available but is not
included in this report. Each station's location is shown on the attached Map A.
Station Summary
Name Location Type H2S Met S02
Alvarez Station (CAB) Kaupili Street C X X X
Wade Station (CAB) Leilani Avenue C X X X
Leilani Station(ASAB) Kahukai Street C X
Nanawale Statton (ASAB) Flower Road B X
Ormat (PGV) SW Adjacent to HGP-A Site F,P X X
Onnat (PGV) SE 1800 ft. sE of Well KS-8 F,P X
Woods Station (PGV) NE of Project Kapaho Rd. B X
Irvine (SAIC) Kahukm Street C
Mobile (CAB) Between KS-8 and E Pad P
Key: C = Community, B = Background, F = Fenceline, P = Permit
PGV = Puna Geothermal Venture, ASAB =Air Surveillance and Analysis Branch,
SAIC = Science Applications International Corporation,
and CAB = Clean Air Branch
4.2 Site Visits
Each of the air monitoring sites were visited and videotaped for reference on July
2&3, 1991, and the equipment and records maintained on site were briefly
reviewed. Quality assurance and quality audit data was requested prior to site
inspection and again during the site visit if it had not yet been provided. The
sampling lines/manifolds, water traps, calibration and Quality Assurance (QA)
equipment were inspected for obvious leaks, bad connections, and maintenance
practices. The station operators were interviewed to determine their extent of
knowledge regarding the station equipment and manner in which it was utilized
and serviced to demonstrate a reasonable level of understanding. The frequency
of maintenance activities, span checks, precision checks and quality audits were
discussed with station operators. An opportunity to explain any equipment
problems that existed was provided. The manner in which collected data was
handled was discussed and the appropriate data and station check forms were
- page 11 -
PGV Report Element III, Part I
requested. Where available, the infonnation was utilized in this review.
Infonnation available from the station logs, fonns or note books including
calibrations, span checks, and audits were reviewed.
4.3 Observations. Discussion and Problems
All existing stations produce reasonably reliable data, with the possible exception
of: 1) the CAB stations when they experience water deposition and condensation
problems in the sample acquisition system; and 2) the PGV-SE station being
artificially low if H2S is scrubbed by material in the manifold. The operators
appeared intelligent, familiar with the instruments, and capable of calibrating and
maintaining the stations operative. Unfortunately, there is a need for an
improved quality assurance and audit program, and some additional equipment
and training at the DOH operated stations.
Quality assurance and auditing problems are minimal for SAIC, greater for
ASAB stations and serious for the CAB stations. Quality assurance audits have
not been perfonned at the CAB sites. The SAIC program could be used as a
model for the other stations operational procedure, if desired. A quality
assurance program requirement as developed and utilized in the Geysers is also
provided in Reference 1 for consideration. The ATC pennit required EPA
guidelines do not exist for H2S monitoring but may be successfully adapted from
existing EPA S02 monitoring procedures. Attention must be paid to some of the
parameters if a 1-3 ppbv.sensitivity is sought.
At a minimum, the SAIC and both state programs should be audited semi-
annually by independent DOH personnel and equipment and preferably on a
quarterly basis. ASAB staff would appear to be in the best position and qualified
to accomplish this task. ·Audits should be perfonned by using equipment
independent from that used for station calibration and precision checks, otherwise
true independent audit requirements are missing. If possible, it would be most
desirable to audit from the intake probe on at least an annual basis. DOH
personnel should inspect SAIC stations on a regular basis and consider being the
primary contract manager of SAIC instead of PGV, though PGV would pay costs
of the contract.
Three different operational entities, operating three small monitoring programs
of similar pUlpose is difficult to endorse. All could benefit from a sharing of
resources to improve spare parts availability, audit frequency, staff time and
operator resource without an increase in costs. Additionally, it was noted that the
DOH stations operate without the extreme security measures that were
implemented with the SAIC sites (cyclone fences and razor wire). DOH stations
were in easily accessible areas and apparently better accepted by the public.
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The two separate state programs and PGV's sponsored SAIC program should be
modified to carefully complement each other, and preferably combined into one
effort governed by a committee that includes significant public environmental
representation and influence in decisions.
There is a need to assure the public that the monitoring results are valid and that
the stations are there at a considerable cost to serve the purpose of protecting the
public interest. It may be appropriate to fonn a consortium under the auspices of
the state to perfonn the monitoring program and specifically identify the stations
to indicate their public importance. Removing the razor wire from the PGV
funded stations would reduce the negative public perception of the monitoring
program function. It should be emphasized that monitoring station operations are
one of the most visible manifestations of commitment to the protection of public
concerns.
Each participant should playa role that enhances the other in performing the
monitoring, quality assurance, quality audits and data verification which adds
credibility even with recalcitrant detractors. The data should thus be credible and
reported as accurately measured numbers which is made widely available.
Problems with past efforts to monitor should be acknowledged, since it is likely
some skepticism results from a failure of that system to report events that some
public members clearly believe they experienced on a semi-continuous basis
during the HGPA project.
Similar circumstances were experienced in the Geysers Geothermal Area
development prior to the formation of a consortium Geysers Air Monitoring
Program (GAMP). This program includes active environmentalists and industry .
and air regulatory agencies who share the decision making power for the Geysers
Air Monitoring Program (GAMP). This unification of mutual interest provided
for public input, helped establish the program objectives and reviewed and
unified all available monitoring data. The purpose of the effort was to generate
technical aerometric information everyone would accept. We are presently in the
third renewal of the program. The costs are paid by the industry and a
contractor operates the stations. The method of operations were determined and
are audited by air agency staff. New industrial members have joined and the
program can be adjusted to accommodate any new monitoring needs. This model
would seem appropriate for the Pahoa area. At a minimum, DOH should audit
the SAIC operated stations on a regular unannounced basis, and possibly serve the
role of contract administrator by having PGV pay costs through the state whom
would contract with SAle. This would increase the credibility of the data in the
public's view and assist PGV/SAIC in establishing credibility of the air
monitoring program that is well deserved.
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4.4 Access to Data and Modernization
Modem access to the·SAIC stations is possible at present, but apparently is not
utilized by DOH. It was not used during this event. To add this feature to the
CAB stations would require minimal effort. The ASAB stations reportedly have
new data loggers planned and could incorporate modem access. This attribute of
data availability should be incorporated promptly into the information tools
available to DOH, both for operational and QA functions, and to assist in
emergency or other air management decisions.
The ASAB stations were in the apparent process of equipment changes and the
CAB stations were only recently established in February of this year. The H2S
monitors (not sampling) system equipment at all sites can be considered modem
and near state of the art. The data logging and permeation tube calibration
equipment at the ASAB stations is outdated and in need of replacement.
Permeation tubes are more problematic than gas bottle dilution systems. All
stations had proper shelters and temperature controls. The data loggers were
nonfunctional at the ASAB stations, but plans are reported to exist for the
upgrade of this equipment. Each entity performing ambient monitoring utilizes a
different sample line and manifold system.
4.5 Intake Manifold and Samplin~ Line Problems
There is a serious problem of water condensation within the sample acquisition
system and a potential for significant analyzer interference at the DOH-CAB
stations. This appears to result primarily from the stainless steel heated intake
probe and manifold not performing in the desired manner. Condensation was so
severe in the sampling line at the "Wade Station" as to cause water pooling in the
sample line prior to the sampling line particulate filter. A potentially more
serious sample line problem exists because of ob~erved corrosion on the exterior
of the stainless steel probes. Similar corrosion is presumed to be occurring in the
internal surfaces of the probe which may scrub or oxidize H2S and therefore
reduce instrument response. The extreme amount of condensation observed in
the sample system will also affect the operation of the S02 scrubber, and
potentially cause H2S to be scrubbed. A verbal recommendation to promptly
first audit all DOH stations and rectify the condensation problem at CAB stations
was given during the site visit. The ambient sample is drawn from the heat
traced manifold horizontally which may also contribute to the condensation
problem. These factors could be expected to cause ambient H2S readings to be
, reported considerably lower than are actually occurring. ·Attempts to dry and
purge the line were immediately made, but the condensation problem was again
present the next day.
The SAIC and ASAB stations use a combination of Pyrex and Teflon for
manifold and sample line. The probes and water drop or insect traps are set up
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in a typical manner to ensure a short residence time and maximize the removal of
dirt or water droplets. The sample line is withdrawn vertically from the top of
the manifold. They appear to perform well with no condensation noted but may
retain a considerable number of trapped insects. In all observed sites more
frequent cleaning of the sampling manifold appears to be necessary. This is
especially a problem at the SAIC - Southeast Station where spider webs and a
light (oil) film was observed in the manifold. The station operator explained that
the agricultural location of the station was an especially serious problem for
sprayexposure(s). The general degraded state of intake probes/manifolds
cleanliness needs to be corrected by regular maintenance at all stations, and can
be suspect of causing artificially low level H2S values. This is especially
important since no audit or check has ever been performed using the entire
probe/sample system, and that also measures the contamination effect which may
reduce the H2S levels prior to analysis. A weekly check, and cleaning, if
necessary, would seem appropriate, and maybe relocation if the problem is not
controllable. It is advised that the external intake probes be directed downward
(even though positioned under an inverted funnel). Consideration of a coarse
insect screen to reduce insects entering the sample manifold might also be
appropriate, but should be further investigated and tested before implementing.
The SAIC stations use a large diameter intake pointed upward and are therefore
especially susceptible to the insect and agricultural spray problems.
Consideration should be given to using a uniform sample probe configuration that
can be as short as possible, incorporates an effective water droplet and insect"
trap, having inlets directed downward, and which avoids the water
carryover/condensation problem. The assembly should be easily leak checked
and cleaned, or replaced on a regular basis at all sites. The manifold should be
positioned or balanced to best track ambient temperatures in an attempt to avoid
condensation.
4.6 Quality Assurance and Data Reduction
Written quality assurance procedures, with appropriate work sheets and forms
are customarily utilized at air monitoring stations. CAB stations in particular
were remiss in this regard, with only a notebook (which is taken off site) used to
record QA activities and instrument adjustments. Qnly the SAIC stations had
posted procedures, adequate work sheets and the customary bound station log.
The station log allows a proper record of station problems, activities and status
that is not removed from the site (duplicate sheets are created). The ASAB
stations, as a result of the initiative of the operator, had a draft operating
procedure for the TECQ instruments, diagrams and clear procedures.
ASAB stations are audited by a semi-independent party quarterly. Unfortunately,
the ASAB equipment utilized is not totally independent, and is typically used to
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check the permeation tubes at both ASAB operated stations. Data loggers were
not functional at ASAB stations. The technician that performs the audits also
services the station and as such, a proper independent audit does not result. The
Irvine station had apparent slow response problem(s) and required two hours for
the daily span and zero check. This response is indicative of equipment problems
which should be resolved. The ASAB stations are considered the poorest
equipped because of the use of permeation tubes, absence of data loggers and
meteorological monitoring.
Data reduction procedures at the ASAB stations were largely by hand reading of
the strip chart, and by data logger dump to a personal computer at the CAB
stations. Monthly data tabulations could not be provided. In both cases the
results had historically been that only zeros were measured and therefore the
formal data reporting had been placed on a low priority.
SAIC has an extensive QA and data handling program that is well documented
and formalized. Still SAIC data tabs show a 1 ppb at 01:00 hours frequently,
which is likely an artifact of the automated span check. These types of
instruments are actually only accurate to plus or minus 2 ppb, or maybe worse,
for zero baseline measurement reporting. Data should be corrected as presently
reported. The stated zero drift tolerance of .025 ppm in the quality assurance
plan fortunately is not used, but again provides good reason to utilize a 10% chart
zero offset to determine the extent of the zero drift.
4.7 Background Data Stations
A review of available measured H2S background data has apparently shown little
or no existing H2S in the vicinity of the project. Actually, all sites show zero
. H2S except when attributed to a source event, or as in the case of SAIC data a
suspected artifact of the span check. Background station operation is at
considerable expense and the continuing effort is difficult to rationalize as
necessary, as incorporated into the ATC permits in the present manner. A
natural emissions inventory could be carried out in the general area, and if
sources are not identified that are likely to contribute, a years worth of no
detectable amounts of H2S for background should be considered acceptable as
establishing background as near and indiscernible from zero. Additional
meteorological monitoring is likely to be more helpful in discerning any
influence of VOG or future volcanic activity, should it occur, and procedure
worked out by the EPA and California Air Resources Board for such events
could and probably should be followed.
It is suggested to use zero H2S as the background value and simplify the
enforceability of permits. The resource saved could be redirected to provide
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bener meteorological monitoring, remote data access, source testing and other
pollutant monitoring that would address public concerns.
4.8 Strip Charts or Hard Copy of Data
Strip charts can be invaluable for use in an area that experiences power failures
or when instrument problems begin to happen. Strip chart recordings were
offset by 10% only at the ASAB stations; however, data loggers at the other sites
can report negative numbers as well as over range numbers and are useful in
determining instrument operation. Nevertheless, it is suggested that dual trace
charts be utilized that operate in two ranges such as 0-100 ppbv and 0- 500 ppbv,
and that a 10% zero offset be utilized to better track and document instrument
drift for the operator. A ten inch chart is also markedly easier to use when
attempting to read in the 5 ppb range. The span and zero drift limits are
tolerable, given the apparent measurement objectives, but need to be clearly
delineated (especially SAIC's QA) as to when adjustments are to be made. All
operators appeared to be aware of this problem.
4.9 MeteorologicaLMonitoring at Stations
There were only three met stations operating as part of the system at the time of
the site inspections. These were located on 10 meter towers at the CAB Wade &
Alvarez and SAIC-SW stations. QA procedures were adequate at SAIC, but were
not documented at CAB. The method of alignment at SAIC was customary and
easily confirmed from the ground. CAB needs to adopt the procedure of aligning
the vane and monitoring arm with true north to easily verify direction by site
inspection and independently audit at least once after establishing a station. The
Irvine site, with its elevated geographical location, is suitable for additional
meteorological monitoring and should include such immediately if concern over
additional venting exists.
5.0 Existing Noise Monitoring Program
5.1 Monitoring Program Description
An extensive effort is put forward to monitor noise by SAIC under contract to
PGV. A PGV staff person charged with permit(s) compliance on site has also
begun to play a more active role in the noise complaint handling and monitoring
effort.
The extent of noise monitors exceeds permit (GRP #21) requirements for
monitoring but may not be recording and utilizing the necessary data. PGV has
three permanent and one mobile continuous noise monitoring stations, one hand
held unit used by PGV staff for complaint evaluation and one that is reportedly
loaned to the public. The Hawaii County and DOH each have a hand held B&K
monitor which is apparently utilized intermittently. All PGV equipment is
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modern Quest Model 2700 or 2800, B&K, etc., yet it is not clear that the
necessary LIO can be measured while under automated operation.
An open ended pipe microphone housing is utilized and intended to be somewhat
directional (pointed at the project area). The housing also provides protection
from the elements; however, they can also be expected to exaggerate the effect of
the rain, wind and insects if they enter or fall on the steel chamber. The
microphones are 1/2 inch Type I, but do not incorporate a dehumidifier. The
calibrators are certified by the manufacturer on the recommended schedule.
Hourly averages are logged and included with aerometric data at the SE and SW
sites. They are downloaded daily and reviewed by SAIC in San Diego.
Additional data loggers are maintained with the stationary monitors and
downloaded into a personal computer for further reduction. A five inch strip
chart recorder is maintained of output data. An SAIC descriptor is available
providing more detail on equipment and procedure. The data at the SE and SW
sites is remotely accessible. The stations are summarized in the table below.
Noise Monitoring Resources
Name Location Make Model LlO LMax
Number
Leilani Station (Irvine) Kahukai Street Quest 2800 M M
Onnat SW,F Adjacent to HGP-A Site Quest 2700 ? ?
OnnatSE,F 1800 flo SE of Well KS-8 Quest 2800 M M
Mobl1e (PGV), P Between-KS-8 and E Pad Quest 2800 M M
.OOH HandHeld B&K 2231 X X
County of Hawaii HandHeld B&K 2225 X X
PGV HandHeld Quest 2800 M M
rov Hand Held - Public Use Quest 2800 M M
Note: L lO and LMax are not aval1able commonly on all Instruments.
5.2 Geothermal Resource Permit (QRP) ReQuirements
From a simple reading of Condition #24 of the GRP, the following is offered as
the applicable two components of the GRP noise limit. The first limit is an L10
of 55 dBA day and an L10 of 45 dBA night (slow A scale) for 20 minute
reporting intervals. The second limit is a 65 dBA day and 55 dBA night
maximum (slow A scale). Authorized exceptions, and procedures for defining
them are given in part C. Monitoring is not presently configured to determine
compliance with these limits. Monitoring is not presently performed at the
nearest residence, and it should be made clear that the SW and SE sites are
acceptable alternatives to the nearest residence requirements for enforcement. A
L10 value for 20 minutes would customarily require more than minute samples
to determine.
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It is obvious that part "a" intends to apply a limit that is modified by part "b" and
the time interval set for this modification is 20 minutes. It might also be argued
that from the reading of part "b" that unless the noise is impact in nature then
limits of "a" apply. It is also clear that BACT is required for exceptions
provided in part "c", and would be determined on an individual exception basis.
It was not possible to evaluate if BACT is being applied for exceptions.
The actual noise limit applicable as practiced and adequacy of reporting is not
clear to this investigator. Does the 10% time allowance of a 10 dBA increase
apply to an L 10 measurement for 20 minute intervals or a maximum of two, one
minute intervals out of a concurrent running 20 minute period of time? Can you
exceed the general limit by more than plus 10 dBA?
It would appear from PGV's present practices that they compute the hourly
averages at monitoring sites, and determine if they exceed the limit. They also
compute and report the twelve hour averages, but it is not clear why. If they do
exceed they see if three or more one minute plus periods of the 20 minute
intervals were also exceeded. If not, then an exceed doesn't occur. If an exceed
occurs, they then determine what caused it with the assistance of the near source
monitor. If it isn't the project (Le. crickets, rain, etc.), then the incident is not
acted upon. The slow dBA maximums and a determination whether they go over
the 65 and 55 dBA levels are apparently not reported.
5.3 Regulatory Noise Needs
DOH or Hawaii County should have at least one monitor with shelter and modem
access that can be used at a persons home when there appears to be a conflict with
the developer. Sound activated tape recorders can also be very useful in some
circumstances. Spot checks performed by an agency would add credibility. Site
inspections of PGV's effort and periodic comparison of calibrators could also add
to the credibility and acceptance of PGV's noise program.
The present noise standards are not likely to be completely acceptable to the
community as levels are allowed to exceed those required for sleep and quiet
outdoor activity. Open windows are apparently customary in Hawaii and worsen
this situation. As the complaint response requirements are intimidating and may
not be appropriate for a friendly resolution of the noise complaint(s), especially
if in compliance and impossible to mitigate, it may place PGV in a difficult
circumstance to resolve. The standards might even be construed as deceitful
'given the obvious fact that the wording allows a level 10 dBA higher 10% of the
time than the 55 and 45 dBA stated as a general noise limitation.
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Typically, noise assessments for BACT are not easy. The LCAQMD has
completed a study and fmalized a report that has been made available to Hawaii
agencies. This might serve as a start. If necessary, the Planning Director should
seek advise from an independent consultant. This is one area where an ounce of
prevention (especially prior to constructing) is worth a ton of control after the
fact.
As an example, steamline pressure release valves were observed during the site
inspection to be without mufflers and not directed away from residents. They
should be muffled and possibly directed to an abatement system to be considered
to qualify as BACT. They are designed to respond to emergencies and will sound
like a large explosion when ruptured because of an over pressure. This would
appear even more important if wellhead shut-in valving must be manually
operated to correct this condition.
As a general comment, except for the requirement of BACT, the GRP and
monitoring program fails to acknowledge that dBA's determine the level of
sound, not noise. Some sounds are extremely irritating, such as brake squeal, and
even at low dBA levels mitigation should be applied. While this fact will be
essential to incorporate into any successful program, it is not achieved without
substantial and careful evaluation of complaints genuinely and sincerely given.
Clearly a preventive technology based and not reactive complaint based
regulatory program is preferred.
Footnote: People don't complain about noise until they are already angry!
6.0 Uncontrolled Venting of KS-8
6.1 Accident Scenario
The accident or uncontrolled release scenario involves several phases, and while
these are not certain, assumptions must be made if the dispersion and ambient
measurements are to be evaluated with meaningful hindsight. The Element ill
Team was to be provided the Element I report but as of 7/17/91 had not received
the report. The following is therefore offered as a plausible sequence of events
as reconstructed from reports and interviews. Video was provided by the public,
but video considered confidential was not viewed nor was evidence taken that
should be treated as confidential. The confidence in the scenario is thus lessened
and may warrant correction.
The initial release of gas and H2S occurred on 6/12/91,18:49 hrs.; while
circulating the bottoms up (drilled material settled on the bottom) after a long
period of stationary inactivity. The drilling mud apparently released H2S as a
distinct and sharply defmed value on the mud measurement equipment (186 ppmv
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peak). Carbon dioxide emissions also increased and were likely mixed with the
H2S. This gas release plume was probably cool, contained heavy gases and would
be anticipated to be poorly or non buoyant, and may have been transported intact
in light winds. There were several odor complaints from neighbors shortly after,
which were probably caused by this release; however, it is unlikely that this
release contributed to the high ambient H2S measurements observed later that
night. After the initial momentary release, the mud showed only normal levels of
C02, and no H2S release is apparent until the major uncontrolled venting
.incident.
The more serious incident began at approximately 23:16 hrs. and involved two or
possibly three quick initial releases of gases and/or steam that caused considerable
damage to the drilling equipment and shook windows of nearby residence. The
shock waves have generally been described as explosive and may have been the
result of water or mud "hammers" built up in the well bore as gases or vapors
evolved. The fluids gained velocity as they were driven to the surface, and
compressed the vapor as they encounter a mechanical blockage. They are a
common problem dealt with in handling high temperature geothermal fluids.
It is uncertain as to the exact nature of the initial release, but it would appear that
a large fracture was encountered capable of producing high temperature flashed
steam. Entrance to a void area may account for the observed weight on the
drilling hook significantly increasing, and within the next few minutes a recorded
14 foot drop of the Kelly. Drilling mud temperatures and pumping pressures
increased then significantly dropped. The gas/vapor release or explosion
necessitated the temporary abandonment of the rig. This initial phase, including
the described "explosions", are assumed to have contributed little in the way of
significant H2S emissions, since the rig deck per~onnel were reported to have not
been acutely exposed to H2S or steam bums. It is not clear any personnel or
occupational exposure alarms were activated.. The alarms may have been
deactivated by the explosion, but even that is not certain. The mud monitoring
equipment was believed to have been made nonfunctional after the first
"explosion".
This initial "explosive" phase was followed by a continuous release of a plume of
saturated steam and water which passed through various points of the rig floor,
through the rig structure siding, out the dog house windows and any open or
ruptured line communicating with the well bore. The plume rise was estimated at
approximately 65 feet. Portions of the plume were redirected downward as it
exited the rig deck skirting. The estimated steam flow was 150,000-200,000
lbslhr. The H2S concentration was not measured, but judging from KS-3 and
other nearby well test for flashed steam, 700-900 ppmw is considered a good
approximation. Given the concentration and estimated flow rate, an emissions
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rate of 105 to 180 pounds an hour of H2S results. PGV estimated 30% of the
water content remained in the flashed steam and reported observing a
characteristic popping noise likely resulting in evaporative cooling. The release
continued 'without apparent change until approximately 06:00 ,Ius on 6/13/91.
At approximately 06:00 hrs on 6/13/91 a line relieving pressure from the casing
was opened, directing the steam horizontally to the west northwest in a 2540
direction with considerable momentum towards the residential areas. The
internal diameter of the choke line is 3" (assumed double strength 4" pipe). The
choke release height is 66" above pad level. Emissions continued as described
previously, though assumed at a reduced rate from the choke or "HCR" line
providing a pressure relief. The total well steam emissions are presumed to have
increased given the two separate release points with the majority of emissions
exiting the choke line. Assuming an approximate 35 foot, 4" double strong pipe
(3.1" ID), and a 3" gate valve fully open, the flows were estimated at 370,000
lbs/hr with 1500 PSI well head pressure 119,000 lbs/hr, at 500 PSI. Since
flashing and carry over occurred, the flow utilized is 200,000 lbs/hr, though
obviously variable. The total steam release is ~stimated to have increased to 200-
250,000 lbs/hr following the inclusion of the choke line. The plume from the
choke line was reported to have mixed to the ground as it passed over the pond
and under the canopy of nearby papaya trees.
Water was pumped down the drill string reaching the bottom of the hole
beginning at 10:30 hrs. on 6/13/91. Venting continued until 04:00 hrs. on
6/14/91 at which time the choke line was closed and water was pumped down the
annulus (well casing minus drill string) causing a pressure drop from a reported
1,700 to 900 psi, and significantly reducing emissions. LCM (plugging material)
was introduced to the annulus and successfully plllgged the escaping steam from
around the steel rams and emissions from the well were reported as controlled by
10:00 hrs on 6/14/91. Most emissions ceased as evident from the noise data by
0600-0700 hrs on 6/14/91. Odor complaints continued and were confirmed by
DOH-CAB staff. PGV is uncertain as to the occasional small steam releases
continuing, or the possibility of a gas cap forming and slowly leaking as gas of
possibly high concentration. The last verified odor complaint apparently
occurred at 22:15 hrs. on 6/15/91, and can perhaps be explained in Part IT of this
report as return flow. If not, one must assume emissions from from KS-8
occurred and caused the complaint.
6.2 Field Air Samplin~ and Noise Monitorin~ Durin~ the Event.
The electrochemical cell alarms and Houston Atlas H2S analyzer on the drilling
site apparently were rendered nonfunctional by the accident and apparently did
not sound an alarm. Instantaneous or short term measurements were made by a
number of different individuals and compiled by PGV and DOH staff for
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consideration. They are incorporated by reference and constitute a substantial
infonnation base.
The H2S monitoring equipment used included a Color Tech Rotating Head
Sampler (DOH), Gas-Tech and Draegar Tubes (DOH & PGV), and a Jerome
(PGV) field portable hand held monitor. Of these methods the Jerome 631x,
followed by the Draegar and Gas Tech tube methods are most reliable. A degree
of darkening detennination must be made for the Color Tech's Rotorods after a
specified interval of rotation and are judged more difficult to accomplish,
especially at night. DOH should plan to convert to a Jerome or similar
equipment.
A considerable number of measurements were made in the immediate area by
DOH staff. These numbers validate the fact that the stationary air monitoring
instruments were not necessarily measuring a worse case at any given time.
Unfortunately, the high value measurements recorded on the property and off the
project that initiated the evacuation, were not compiled as part of those data
sheets.
Questioning of PGV and drilling staff disclosed that several values in the ppmv
range were measured. The first values reported, consistent with the Emergency
Plan requirement, were directly downwind of the uncontrolled vent off the
project site and were the highest reported at 29 & 22 ppmv (29,000 & 22,000
ppbv). These values, reported by a PGV staff member, either resulted in, or
confinned the early decision to evacuate the Lanipuna Estates. Questions were
posed as to whether the value was in error, and if it could have possibly been a
misread of the display. The PGV staff member who made the measurements
stated the second reading was to make sure he had not misread the instrument,
and that he had not misplaced the decimal. He appeared to be competent,
knowledgeable and capable of properly operating the instrument. He had
previously used the instrument. Generally three distinct samples are taken, but
the first sample should, if not representative, be lower than the actual number.
On 6/14/91 the instrument was compared to an H2S excursion measured at the
Irvine Air Monitoring Station and agreed within 10%. At the time of the site
inspection on 7/3/91 it was suggested that a span check be perfonned, but the
instrument had apparently suffered a malfunction, and was to be returned to the
manufacturer. No reason to disqualify or discard the numbers generated by the
instrument· are apparent.
The PGV staff member deserves compliment for acting in a responsible and
timely manner consistent with the Emergency Plan in reporting the values. The
middle of a potential emergency is the wrong time to doubt an instrument
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purchased for and used in the manner designated. Subsequent numbers taken by
Draeger and Gas Tech methods make the initial high numbers even more
plausible. A reading of 20 ppmv was reported adjacent but immediately upwind
of the rig, a 5 ppmv value was reported approximately 500 ft downwind
measured at 10 am on 6/13/91, and a 2.9 ppmv value was reported as measured at
600 feet downwind at about 11 am on 6/13/91. All occurred after the 29 ppmv
measurement taken immediately after the accident. This information would
indicate a validity of the higher number based on the lesser dispersion likely to
have occurred with the initial release under nighttime conditions.
The use of this Jerome 631x owned by PGV was extensive. From conversations
with PGV and DOH staff, and in our experience, it is more likely to produce
useful, timely, extensive and accurate data than the other methods utilized. The
survey mode is especially appropriate for use in cases of accident investigation to
warn the user as well as make measurements. The H2S values collected by the
Draegar or Gas-Tech method, can be considered reliable if in the ppm range.
They are more characteristically used in the work environment. The Color Tech
Rotorod is not advised simply because superior alternatives exist. The sample is
an integrated 10 minute or longer sampling and the degree of shading must be
judged from a comparison chart subject to operator interpretation.
6.3 Field Noise Monitoring During the Event
. The noise monitoring effort was significant and continued throughout the event.
There is little disagreement that the legal limits were exceeded by a substantial
and continuing amount at all permanent monitoring stations. The reader is
referred to the "Puna Geothermal Venture, Noise Monitoring Program, Well
Blow Out Data Report, June 1991 fl. The uncontrolled venting noise levels clearly
exceeded GRP permit limits by 25 to 35 dBA. Numerous spot measurements
were made by a consultant and PGV staff whom surveyed the area and reported
similar results demonstrating the widespread noise exceeds. Compliance was re-
established after controlling the vent.
6.4 Drift and Emissions Estimates
Results of an analyses of drift reported to be deposited on the windshield of a
visitor to the site using EPA method 601 was submitted by a public member and
is presented below. Catchment analyses was performed on four homes.
Apparently, these are the only samples taken during the event for constituents
other than H2S. It should be noted that such sample collection, while of interest,
does not establish the deposition rate which is critical to understanding any
effects. It may, however, establish the need to consider decontamination cleaning
of equipment with significant drift deposits and indicate a need for additional
source and ambient testing. Sample collection three weeks later is not viewed as
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rational, and such was not suggested. The components of the windshield deposit
is as follows:
u·d 1RComponent eporte va ue nIts
Lead 678 ppmw
Nickel 90 ppmw
Chromium 72 ppmw
Manganese 118 ppmw
copper 16.3 ppmw
Zinc 19.2 ppmw
Arsenic less than 10ppmw
Iron 6.53 percent
Aluminum 1.56 percent
The catchment samples were taken on the afternoon of 6/13/91 and show no
exceeds of drinking water standards, though some components of concern were
shown to be present at the Alvarez residence. The data should be compared to
future, or if available past, analysis. If the effort was properly designed, and
consideration of water volumes, rain, evaporation, etc., were incorporated, these
sites might serve as long term recording sites. At the present time it is
inappropriate to conclude anything other than the catchment waters met suggested
standards on 6/13/91.
6.5 Monitoring And Actions That Should Have Been Considered
No abatement was in place and no apparent or reported attempt to barrier the
noise, sample the plume, or redirect the plume was made. Plans for the future
should bring these issues forward for consideration promptly once personnel
safety issues are addressed. A system should be prepared and valved into place
during any future high risk drilling to control noise .and air emissions. A cyclone
and H2S abatement system as used during air drilling might be appropriate.
There was apparently no drift samples collected by DOH or PGV. This task
could have been easily accomplished at established intervals downwind, and
would have aided greatly in assessing the potential impact on water catchments
and particulate release. No sample of downwind TPSP or PM-I0 measurements
were made.
The permits require quantification and characterizations of emissions by the
permit holder after a malfunction resulting in a 100 ppb exceed. These are
apparently not available (see ATC Condition #23) and as of 7/15/91 they have
not been provided and are assumed to not exist. The closest located characterized
well is KS-3. Test data from it and other nearby wells were obtained from
Thermochem which is contracted to PGV for chemical analyses. These analysis
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are utilized to produce the emissions plume descriptors. There is no assurances
that the characteristics of ~S-7 or KS-8 is similar, and in fact given the reported
30 ppmv values for H2S on the rig deck during the KS-7 "gas kick", they may be
significantly different. The evaluation of drift deposited on the windshield from
the plume of KS-8 would indicate such is the case.
6.6 Emissions Estimates of Trace Components
The following concentrations were utilized as estimators for potential impacts and
are based largely on well KS-3 and KS-IA simply because that was the only data
provided for close proximity wells. Additional data may be available but has not
been provided. A steam condensate analysis for well KS-3 was performed by
Utah Research Institute on 3/30/91 and provided on 7/15/91. Sampling methods
did not detail if a complete steam analysis was accomplished but a verbal check
and review of the results indicate a simple analysis of condensate. Ion closure
was not apparent. Values were reported as non detectable except for salt
components. It appears that the analysis required by ATC Condition #20 have
not been completed and significant portions of constituents largely ignored from
an analytical chemistry perspective. The possibility of using HGP-A data was
suggested, but judged inappropriate as the resource is somewhat removed. The
issue of brine occlusion and drift carry through in the absence of flashed steam
passing through a separator is difficult to ascertain (it is estimated a 30% carry
through occurred). The constituent contaminants entering the flashed steam
depends si~ificantly on the dynamics of the flash and water droplet removal·
process, especially if down hole flashing is occurring. A conservative approach
would be to use the brine numbers directly, or at 30% although emissions level
estimates would be biased high.
UULComponent ower 'pper mts
hydrogen sulfide 493 1200 ppmw
ammoma 0.168 1.49 ppmw
arsenIC unreported unreported
lead unreported unreported
cadmium unreported unreported
chlorides unreported unreported
boron unreported unreported
mercury unreported unreported
ph unreported unreported
Total Dissolved Solids unreported unreported
Total Suspended Solids unreported unreported
nickel (not required) unreported unreported
chrome (not required) unreported unreported
unreported unreported
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The only data that appeared relevant and could possibly be used to determine
components of flashed steam were for KS-l A total brine and post flash brine.
Mass balancing using the reported 0.7989 flash fraction is shown below. The
data does not appear to be useful since the computed values are likely within the
analysis error.
Component Post Flash Total Brine Steam, ppmw
Arsenic 0.49 0.1 0.00182876
Mercury 0.0017 0.0003 -5.241E-05
Boron 8.43 1.7 0.00591689
Silica 1170 235.27 -0.0212793
Aluminum <2.50 <.50 na
Barium 32.3 6.5 0.00559519
Manganese 8.13 1.63 -0.0061873
Chloride 18500 3720.06 -0.3629991
Fluoride 0.91 0.18 -0.0037564
Sulfate 14.2 2.86 0.00548254
Total Dissolved 33100 6655.89 -0.650895
Solids
After some dicussion and analysis, it was determined a valid characterization
could not be provided, but is dependent upon the nature of volatilization and
carry through. Therefore in Part IT of this report emissions are assumed to be .
100% of those of brine provided in the ATC application.
The reader is refered to Part IT of this report for an estimation of brine content
based upon the PGV application provided information, and estimates of possible
impact.
6.7 Event Evaluation & Recommendations: an Air Quality Perspective
The accident was not anticipated nor acknowledged until undelWay. Abatement
technology to control emissions was not in place. Management and analytical
characterization of emissions was not available. This limited the assessment of
impact potential. Field measurements were not correlated to emissions or the
configuration characteristics of the release as the accident continued. Estimation
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of emissions did not occur though venting continued for a substantial period of
time. The accident happened during a least desirable time of the day to handle an
emergency.
. In forecasting and detecting the event, it is apparent the failure of down hole
temperature probes, the earlier gas release of H2S resulting in complaints, and
the lost circulation should help warn operators of risk in the future. It may be
practical to improve the mud logging gas detector(s) response time by adding a
second but less sensitive detector or Jerome type sensor with a quicker response
time to the mud monitoring operation. Presently, the configuration and
instrument have a delay of several minutes. Relocating the mud sampling device
(versus sample transport through a sample line) is an alternative. A second
readout device could also be displayed on the rig deck. Drilling slower and
circulating more mud when near suspect depth, paying attention to bottoms-up
characteristic and carefully monitoring the heat load and volume changes of the
mud (this is done at present) are obviously appropriate, given hindsight. The
issue would be how slow to drill, and to take steps that maximize the response
speed. It may be appropriate to look for mud components (Le. high chloride)
characteristic of geothermal brines, or other gases that might be occluded into the
mud and not necessarily be released or detected. If a high pressure entry appears
likely, appropriate parties should be notified and placed on alert and continued
drilling delayed to reasonable daylight hours.
If an accident or pressure release occurs, it would be desirable to be prepared to
characterize the emissions as soon as practical. The on site Ex-Log (Tectonic)
staff are generally capable of doing this for H2S and should be assigned the task
with possible assistance of other .staff. A direct in-steam sample probe might be
necessary and should be prepared ahead of time. Samples should also be collected
for other components such as drift and particulate. Analysis should be repeated
as frequently as practical and necessary to track the venting steam characteristics.
An estimate of emissions release point height and total release would be
necessary, and could be made from visual inspection, well head pressure (if
necessary it can be estimated from the temperature using steam tables) and the
size of vent(s). This information should be provided to the emergency or event
managers whom can with this information and existing' real time meteorological
data, utilize mathematical models to anticipate the worse case plume path and
probable concentrations. Field staff can be directed to these areas to establish the
validity of predictions through monitoring and to visually observe downwind
locations and areas generating public complaint.
Air pollution control technology to treat an uncontrolled or forced-release should
be required to be in place and operational prior to drilling in areas at depths
suspect of behaving like KS-8. This could include valved in large capacity
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pressure relieve valves, H2S abatement capability, wet cyclones for particulate
removal and noise mitigation, and possibly even a large capacity muffler or stack.
A typical system is shown in Figure 2, which also utilizes hydrogen peroxide to
oxidize and stabilize H2S. These need to have the capability of being promptly or
automatically activated. The system should have an overcapacity, be directed in
the best direction and sampling ports built in at appropriate locations to allow
determination of emissions. Consideration of removing the ATC limitation on
air drilling should also be evaluated if the developer believes that method to be
safer, and perhaps more capable of controlled drilling. The practice of allowing
short term uncontrolled venting (7 minutes, per ATC) needs to be evaluated as to
possibility of appropriate concern for loosing control of such venting and rather
abatement is in place to mitigate.
During the site inspection, a review of the records and interviews with staff, the
quantifying and considering of the above factors was always a secondary
objective. This is really the only way to protect the public. No amount of
monitoring, after the fact analysis, or good intention will improve the air quality
wi~o~t the preventive steps to avoid, control as necessary and manage temporary
emISSIons.
6.8 Interaction with Emer~ency Response
PGV staff and agency staff did act responsibly in implementing the Emergency
Response Plan, which is the subject of Element II. PGV and their staff member
whom acted promptly and reported the first high values displayed a commitment
to the protection of the public. This was apparent from the joint committee on
Element IT meeting attended.
It is clear that you can not put enough permanent air monitoring stations in the
community or deploy sufficient field monitoring equipment to measure pollutants
at the time of a large air emissions release to represent "worse case" which will
tell you, with certainty under all possible conditions, when to evacuate without
the considerable risk of being too late, in error, or without an adequate safety
margin. It is for this reason that emergency responders also need to consider
personal H2S safety alarm needs.
Monitors such as the Jerome, which can measure over a wide range and also act
as a personal warning system (in survey mode), are best suited for field
measurements in suspected high and low value areas. The use of mathematical
models as noted above, can be automated with modem meteorological systems,
but this type of system must be in place prior to any accident. If an accident and
event continues for an extended period of time, as the subject one did, such tools
can prove invaluable. The compliance and community air monitoring system can
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greatly assist in making and confinning decisions and impacts, but only if
emissions data is also available or they happen to be in the worse case location.
When developing a new resource and technology there simply are no guarantees,
and to offer such is to raise skepticism in a careful person. A good healthy dose
of such skepticism for DOH staff would be appropriate for this project at this
point. The drilling safety, blowout prevention and well integrity issues should
properly be the responsibility of agencies which specialize in the area, or a third
party (with adequate bonding and insurance) should be utilized to assess
developer procedures and plans.
7.0 DOH Authority to Construct Pennit No. A-833
It was agreed prior to the initiation of this independent investigative effort that a
pennit review could not be accomplished in more than a precursory manner, and
would need substantial more time than available at present to complete. The
summary below is mostly relevant only to the specific uncontrolled venting
accident of 6/12/91/ to 6/14/91 and should not be considered complete or relevant
to the many required perfonnance criteria, plans, notifications, etc. The site was
visited on the afternoon of 7/2/91 with DOH staff and again on 7/4/91.
The most relevant pennit conditions are as follows. Condition #23 was
implemented when the stations measured H2S above 100 ppbv for an hour
average. Similarly if the uncontrolled venting is considered a blowout, Condition
#26 applies regardless of impact. Both conditions require a report within five
days that is to include "the estimated project emissions". Condition #13 has a
similar requirement for well equipment failure. Condition #11 has a similar
requirement for "each steam release incident" or "inadvertent release". To date
this estimate has not been provided the investigative team, and was not available
for the emergency planning. The level of contamination and net emissions from
the source would have greatly assisted the emergency response, and should have
been available in a competent manner as soon as possible. Emission estimates
were also requested by this investigation for the KS-7 gas kick, but have not been
provided. This Jack of apparent source testing and emissions characterization
makes it difficult to manage and greatly lessens the ability to learn from such
accidents. The limitations placed on the emissions sources must ensure the
ambient goals under worst case. Figure 1 utilized to explain the LCAQMD
program explains in a simplistic manner the necessary components of a
regulatory system. The pennit at several points is confused by differing ambient
goals under different operational or breakdown scenarios (i.e., the standard of
performance is 5 ppb, a 25 ppb increment, or 100 ppb). There is an obvious
attempt to make the pennit BACT driven, but goals appear to be set to
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accommodate potential problems the developer may encounter, and not to achieve
defined ambient air goals.
Per Condition #23 the drilling is to proceed only "after the permittee has
demonstrated to the Department of Health that contributions from the well ... will
not result in or contribute to the exceed hydrogen sulfide ambient concentration
of 100 ppbv". This latter requirement is a substantial obligation and one that is
unlikely to be made with great certainty. Clearly it calls for mitigation to control
or avoid repeats of the subject uncontrolled venting. Condition #23 goes on to
state notifications can not constitute a defense to violations.
Condition #13 requires "During well equipment failure or malfunction which
result in hydrogen sulfide emissions, the permittee shall apply best available
control technology, etc. It is not clear that the well equipment for Condition #13
purposes, also means during drilling. The electrochemical cell referenced for
flow testing results were not available and it is not clear it has been or is practical
to be utilized. If in fact they were available and deemed accurate, they should
have been used to help quantify the uncontrolled venting emissions. The
LCAQMD experiences with such devices has been negative in nature, and would
warn that such results may be unreliable.
Condition # 17 has several other requirements such as increasing the weight of
mud, shutting in the well, limiting emissions to five (5.0) pounds per hour, no
more than seven (7) minutes of venting, and "In no case shall air drilling be
used". The 5 lb/hr emissions rate needs to be clarified as to whether it is an
instantaneous rate or the two combined allow a "42 lb/hr instantaneous rate" or
greater provided it does not continue for more than 7 minutes. The air drilling
restriction may be counterproductive in the event the resource is different than
expected. The removal of this restriction should be considered. Though it make.s
for more expense and difficult management, it may be the safest manner in which
to proceed.
Condition #5 requires an ambient monitoring program that has been implement-
ed, and is the focus of this report.
Condition #20 requires the very kind of information needed for power plant and
well field environmental design considerations and to help estimate emissions as
was desired in this case. Unfortunately, there is no specified time to perform or
submit the data from the tests, and tests apparently have not been performed to
date. The condition should be modified to be accomplished during initial well
venting (clean out with no separator) and again during separation and flash
testing. Given the high chloride content in the resource, tests should include gas
phase HCL and possibly HF. Other constituents of concern should be considered
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as infonnation develops on the character of the resource. Tests should be
carefully thought out and perfonned using geothennal resource sampling
techniques and analysis (not wastewater). Chemical characterization of the
resource is critical at the earliest possible time to assist in ensuring that plant and
emissions control equipment reliability is not going to be adversely effected by
any unexpected constituent(s), and that unexpected emissions of concern not go
unquantified. A very high temperature versus low temperature flash resource
should initiate such careful review.
DOH staff should review circumstances and decisions as infonnation is made
available to assist in anticipating problems and in detennining appropriate pennit
to operate conditions. Frequent and or long tenn stacking, if necessary because
of reliability problems, will create air quality and project cost problems. The
claimed BACT efficiency of the present stacking control for H2S and particulate
removal (including injected NaOH) needs to be substantiated prior to need, by
testing under good dispersion. It is likely the sunken location will present some
unique plume characteristics. The effects of allowing direct infiltration of
alkaline scrub solution laden with dissolved H2S needs to be evaluated. Especially
given the fact that acidification of the waste stream will release H2S and such
might be confused with background or geogenic H2S in the future. It appears
that little need for the facility is anticipated, but only experience will detennine
this need and a careful update is appropriate.
The peak values of H2S are commonly five times the hourly average during the
uncontrolled venting. People smell and commonly respond to peak or short tenn
values. The closer the proximity the greater the maximum exposures are likely
to be, and the worse the already intolerable AAQS of 100 ppbv will be
considered by those exposed. This issue is especially relevant to Condition #17.
More careful consideration in light of the complaints received should be given to
lowering this limit, detennining what technology to mitigate is available and
possibly establishing a shorter tenn standard.
The number of reports and notices required per well is quite large and. may serve
to further enlighten as to compliance. They are listed below for further
reference and should be evaluated as to whether they have been filed and contain
useful information. It was beyond the scope of this effort to accomplish such a
task.
Special Condition 2
- notification prior to construction
Special Condition 5
- siting plan for required air quality and met station(s)
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- in the event of a one hour average H2S concentration greater than 25 ppb
(above background) and 100 ppb (including background)
Hilo Dist. Health Office also notified
- monthly air quality and met summaries
- annual electronic file (2 copies) for air quality and met data
Condition 7
- 2 days prior to aerated mud drilling
- 2 days prior to aerated water drilling
- 2 days prior to well venting
- 2 days prior to flow testing operations, and
- 2 days after completion of aerated mud drilling
- 2 days after completion of aerated water drilling
- 2 days after completion of well venting
- 2 days after completion of flow testing operations
Special Condition 9
- request to flare excess gas
- post event flaring report
Special Condition 13
- notification if abated H2S rate is 5 lbslhr or more (flow testing)
- notification (immediate) of equipment malfunction/failure
- post event report within 5 days
Condition 15
- Daily reports on H2S upstream, NaOH injection rates, and H2S concentration
and emission rates downstream during flow testing
Special Condition 17
- in the event of inadvertent steam releases during well drilling of more than 7
min/hr or H2S emissions of 5 lbs/hr or more
Condition 18
- chemical abatement plan prior to flow testing
Condition 19
- upon release of any toxic emissions into the ambient air (as mitigation)
·Special Condition 21
- diesel usage (by engine and well) at completion of well
- certification of fuel injection timing adjustment (retard) for three diesel engines
used for rig no. 2, prior to startup
Special Condition 22
- 2 day written in advance of unabated well venting
- Public notification (newspaper notice) 24 hrs in advance
- Residents within 3500 ft. notified 24 hrs in advance
Special Condition 23
- upon exceeding 100 ppb (one hour average) H2S ambient level
- post event report within 5 days
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Condition 26
- upon well blowout
- post event report within 5 days
- weekly report - if a continued blowout
Special Condition 28
- H2S hourly average for monitoring data >25 ppb (above background)
Hilo Dist. Health Office also notified
Attachment 1-7
- upon completion of construction or installation of any equipment covered by the
NC
Normal operations for implementation of the 5 ppb increment needs to be defined
with certainty. Does this include stacking emissions should the plant have long
term operational problems? As presently worded, it may encourage venting just
to keep the limitation from being enforceable.
Review of the plant and well field components reliability in view of any
significant changes in resource temperature, chemical characteristic, etc., and the
likelihood that reliability will be affected should be carried out.
Drift and trace materials are measured in Lake County even now that they are
largely controlled and very low, just to alleviate public concern and verify
emission assumptions and measurements. Such a program should be considered
for inclusion in Hawaii. Drift needs to be characterized for accidental and
controlled vents. This includes clean outs, and future stacking relative to possible
effects on catchments and vegetation. This monitoring would compliment the
existing H2S program and might also utilize PIXE or Dicot/XRF analysis of
repairable particulate.
Meaningful source tests need to be performed and comparative results established
for BACT decisions as published for stacking mufflers, and other components.
These appear to be inconsistent with LCAQMD experience and the anticipated
abatement needs to be tested as soon as practical by properly conducting source
tests. The gas reinjection system is nearly identical to that used at Coso Hot
Springs, which did not operate as hoped, and is now on a variance allowing two
hundred and fifty (250) pounds per hour emissions.
8.0 Public Members. Comments and Questions Offered
The most common statement was that this (the accident) must not happen again.
Clearly the public feels threatened by the event and the potential for
reoccurrence. The belief that they have been ignored was common near the
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project area, and across the board all felt that the health effects issue was being
ignored. Conversations with DOH and the Pahoa Homeowners association
members lead to the recognized need to investigate and correlate complaints with
technical dispersion infonnation. This is addressed in Part II of this report. An
attempt has been initiated that should be carried on. The data is unique and can
add much to our knowledge about air pollution and H2S exposure.
It was also noted that reported effects sometimes given in response to a complaint
and even the effects table for H2S indicates a less severe effect and mortal danger
at higher levels than is more commonly accepted. For example, compare the
POV application with the DOH news release of 6/13/91. A fireman compared the
numbers with a nationally distributed database, and asked if some people were
.more sensitive and what the effects were on infants. Obviously, these are real
concerns that are only worsened when infonnation conflicts. In reality, it is clear
no one should be exposed to levels even approaching the higher levels generally
quoted, and the fact that they will not be needs to be made completely believable.
The following questions and comments were also commonly expressed. How
would this matter have faired if it had been on the E or HOPA pad sites? How
close is too close. At times it is simply easier to just buy property or replace
systems than mitigate against expected accidents! Nuisance easement or purchase
of homes should be a possibility! Why aren't other toxic components measured?
The state is just doing what the developer proposes in writing pennits! It is
obvious that public questions and emotions still need to be addressed.
Working on a common need can help tum the public into a resource instead of an
adversary, by including them in reacting in a positive manner to an adverse
situation. The need for community involvement, assurance and empowennent
will be greater than ever if they are to accept the project as a neighbor. Obvious
concern exists over future development, and if this could be better quantified it
might lessen anxiety. The people are a real resource and their energy and
concern must be directed to positive change.
Emergency Plan: The stationary air monitoring network can and should be
used to assist emergency management decision making, but not as the primary
criteria in the absence of reasonable worse casellocation infonnation.
Some people are convinced that there is a master plan and they have no possibility
of influencing decisions unless they act irrational.
Conclusions Air
1. The plume release characteristics and quantity of H2S were more severe
than assumed plausible in the existing worst case blowout scenario incorporated
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into the facility permitting. Impacts were worsened by the nature of the
uncontrolled release and the directing of the high velocity release plume through
a pipe and valve setup in a horizontal direction toward the nearby residential
area. Monitoring of noise and air was extensive.
2. A high of 29,000 ppbv (29 ppmv) was measured off the development
property and reported. Additional measurements on the drill pad and
approximately 500-600 ft downwind of the plume confirm the likelihood of this
high value which initiated evacuation. Ambient stations recorded several
excursions above the 100 ppbv level. Some air monitoring stations did not
completely respond to H2S excursions.
3. A variety of methods were used to take measurements by several
different parties. Not all of this data appears to have been compiled to date into
one report. The higher values were not included in the data provided by DOH.
4. The existing stationary air monitoring network in place at the time of the
accident was extensive for H2S. A total of seven (7) Pulse Fluorescence Detector
(TECO and Monitor Lab) instruments were operational for the detection of H2S
within a few miles (see map A). Only three meteorological monitoring stations
were in place. A meteorological monitoring station established by PGV's
predecessor was operated adjacent to the drill site until 6/12/91. However, the
data was not audited or reported. This is really quite a wealth of exposure effects
and monitoring information for air agency review. The health survey
information provided by the public needs to ~ evaluated extensively, and the
permit standards considered.
5. Minor maintenance and quality assurance problems exist at all of the air
monitoring stations. These problems are more severe for DOH operated stations.
With the exception of sample line condensation problems at the DOH-CAB
stations, it is unlikely that the reported values are markedly different or lower
than actual ambient H2S levels that occurred. The SE station manifold is dirty
enough and has an oil film that could reduce reported values. The need for zero
stability and calibration for H2S at low concentrations is great for the desired
accuracy referenced in ATC permits.
6. No measurements of ambient drift, trace metal particulate, total
particulate or gases other than H2S have been made by DOH or PGV.
7. No source tests to characterize the incident vented steam content of H2S,
salts, particulate or trace toxics were made.
8. No attempt to abate air emissions or mitigate noise were made during the
uncontrolled venting, other than to regain control and stop the venting. A high
pH mud and water was reported to be used when trying to control the well that
adds some abatement potential.
9. Health and nuisance complaints were made at a variety of locations to
several agencies/parties. These have not yet been compiled into one report or the
validity of the complaints completely investigated.
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10. Resource characterizations required by the ATCpennit for tested wells
do not appear to have been completed to date or the data could not be provided
this investigative team. The actual level and quantity of H2S and other emissions
can only be estimated.
11. No quality audits of the SAIC stations by DOH have been perfonned or
are planned. SAIC is under contract to PGY/OEIS not DOH.
12. No fonnal sharing of quality assurance or audit functions by the three
entities perfonning air monitoring occurs.
13. A distrust exists between the various effected parties and government.
The tenn at "war" was used. All parties need to get together to facilitate good
management when an undesirable circumstance occurs. No one wanted, or
should be willing to accept this accident as a continuing type of occurance, or
desire to avoid remedying. This circumstance, in this investigators opinion, is a
result of a lack or perceived lack of any major role played by DOH in resolving
complaints, ensuring abatement and perfonning verification of pennit
compliance. The perception is not equitable to DOH and needs to be corrected.
The pennits also are in need of improvement. PGY operates and responds to
most complaints in a process that would generally be considered somewhat
intimidating. In short, some of the public doubt DOH is looking after their best
interest when issuing or enforcing pennits, and are concerned about bad politics,
the unknown and additional perceived problems at the facility. The uncontrolled
venting has heightened this concern and anxiety.
14. Any distrust of the public and policy makers will increase as the public
learns the one hour 100 ppbv limit is unacceptable and that their complaints have
commonly resulted at levels far below the value.
15. The close proximity of many residents heightens the potential for a high
exposure occurring and going unmeasured. It is unlikely a warning can be
provided for a massive and sudden release unless they are incorporated into the
drilling program warning system directly.· ,
16. Peak levels of H2S were commonly four to eight fold that of hourly
averages measured (reported on clock hours).
17. Telephone modem access exist at SAIC operated stations, but is not
utilized by DOH. Modem access to DOH stations is not in place, but could
reasonably be added. DOH stations should use the CAB data logger with modem.
18. Source tests and characterization need to be completed promptly,
including for such items as HCL and other corrosive materials.
19. The cellars are dangerous to the workers, and could add difficulty to any
repair necessary. The need for them for volcanic lava flows should be carefully
considered against risks. Someone is going to get hurt if an H2S head gas leaks
through a valve, or they are in the cellar when an unintentional steam release
occurs.
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Conclusions Noise
1. During the uncontrolled venting, noise levels clearly exceeded GRP
pennit limits by 25 to 35 dBA. Numerous spot measurements were made by a
consultant and demonstrated the widespread noise exceeds. Similarly PGV staff
surveyed the area and reported similar results. Compliance was quickly re-
established after controlling the vent.
2. PGV has three pennanent and one mobile continuous noise monitoring
station, one hand held unit used by PGV staff for complaint evaluation and one
that is reportedly loaned to the public. The equipment is modem (Quest Model
2700 or 2800), and reasonably deployable to detennine compliance with the GRP
condition #21. The single ended open pipe microphone housing utilized is
intended to be somewhat directional and provide protection from the elements;
however, it can also be expected to exaggerate the effect of the rain, wind, and
insects if they enter or fall on the steel chamber. It also excludes to some degree
non project noise.
3. The limit incOlporated into the GRP is cumbersome and could even be
considered misleading. The levels allowed at night are known to interfere with
sleep and daytime levels can interfere with speech. The pennit condition uses
uncustomary verbiage, and it would be difficult to establish compliance or
violations with presently reported data.
4. The project_ noise is often the dominant noise in the area, though rain,
wind, insects, and residential neighborhood noises dominate and/or contribute
significantly to the noise levels measured at times.
5. Considerable SAIC/PGV staff effort is expended on the noise monitoring
program, which is designed to isolate project contribution at times of complaints
or exceeds. A complaint line and protocol of operation exists that would be
intimidating to anyone whom is not an aggressive person or pushed to the point
of being angry. It appears SAIC/PGV procedures do not measure LI0's as
required by the pennit, and if automated measurement of such is not possible
with the Quests monitors needs to be resolved.
6. DOH and Hawaii County has available a hand held B&K, but their
involvement in evaluations of compliance or responding to complaints appears to
be inconsistent. DOH's involvement is limited since the state ordinance applies
only on the island of Oahu. Hawaii County responds to the complaints as
required in the issued GRP.
7. Hand held monitors are unlikely to be able to easily detennine
compliance or a lack of such unless the maximums are exceeded, or part A of
GRP Condition #24 is applicable in the absence of impact noises.
8. The direct drive drilling rigs are not nonnally considered BACT in Lake
County, however the extent of noise mitigation is impressive to the point of
perhaps qualifying as BACf. Unfortunately, the extent the rig must be enclosed
to achieve noise goals must be evaluated from a drilling staff safety perspective.
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FIGURE 1
FUNCTIONS OF AN AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT
The Lake County Air Quality Management District and other air districts in the state are charged
with maintaining an effective air pollution control program to protect public health and welfare and
thus ensure the enjoyment of the physical environment in which we live. Such a program must
incorporate a method to attain and maintain air quality standards, abate public nuisance and health
hazards present in the ambient air, and be responsive to nuisance complaints from citizenry.
Minimum ambient air quality standards are set by the federal and state governments, and
implementation plans have been enacted in all districts (generally consisting of rules and
regulations) to attain and maintain air quality within these standards.
For even the most simplistic air quality cpntrol program there are several essential components.
These include:
1. Establish a goal (ambient air quality standard);
2. Monitoring of the air (decide if the goal has been reached);
3. Detennine the source of air polLtants (emission inventory);
4. Develop a control strategy (adopt rules and regulations);
5. Enforce control strategy (ensure compliance with adopted rules and regulations).
These activities are not independant of each other but are links in achain; when one is nonexistant
an effective control program will not exist. The ambient air quality standard is the most crucial
parameter and determines the need for the other components. These components are presented
graphically below.
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